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The Appellant, Michael F. Nyman, by and through his
attorneys, respectfully submits the following Reply Brief in
further support of his appeal.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
The Appellant denies that he failed to adequately marshal
the relevant facts.

In response to the numbered paragraphs set

forth by the Appellee, the Appellant states as follows:
1.

The statement that none of Appellant's tax notices make

specific reference to Lot 17 assumes that Summit County's
conveyance to Appellant in 1937 did not have the legal effect of
a severance of that portion of Lot 17 occupied by Appellant's
predecessors.
appeal.

Moreover, this is one of the key issues in this

The Appellee's statement presumes that these tax notices

are complete

legal descriptions. Such a presumption is

unwarranted.
2.

In response to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Appellee's

Statement of Relevant Facts, the Appellant informs the Court that
these facts, as far as they are relevant to this appeal, have
previously been set forth in Appellant's Statement of Facts
paragraph numbers 9, 10 and 12.
3.

In response to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Appellee's

Statement of Relevant Facts, the Appellant agrees with the
statements contained therein.

However, these statements are not

relevant to the issues as they are presented on appeal.

1

This

portion of Appellant's chain of title is not at issue.
4.

In response to paragraph number 8, the Appellant agrees

that the current garage may have been built in 1948.

However,

the Appellant asserts that other structures and the perimeter of
the property claimed by Appellant have been established and not
objected to since at least 1906.x
5.

The Appellant agrees with the statement in paragraph 9

of Appellee's Statement of Relevant Fact.

What the Appellant

meant was that Summit County's right to the property accrued in
193 0 as a result of the non-payment of property taxes by Backman.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court wrongly granted summary judgment in favor of
the Appellee.

The Appellant (through his predecessors in

interest) obtained his property from Summit County at a tax sale
in 1937.

The property acquired by Appellant in 1937 included a

home and other structures, including a garage which, as it turns
out, is situated on part of Lot 17 which Appellee claims he owns.
Likewise, Appellee (through his predecessors in interest)
obtained his property from Summit County at a tax sale subsequent
to Appellant's acquisition of his property.
The Appellant maintains that when he acquired his property
from Summit County in 1937, he acquired the property as it was

This fact was not asserted at the trial court level.
This issue is a new one on appeal.
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actually possessed.

Thus, since he received a direct conveyance

of the disputed property from Summit County, Summit County could
not later convey to Appellee that which it had already conveyed
to Appellant.
In the alternative, Appellant has acquired title to the
property by adverse possession.

The Appellant has possessed the

land in the statutorily prescribed manner in excess of the
statutorily required time period.

Moreover, under Utah law, the

Appellant can assert a claim of adverse possession against Summit
County.
Finally, if the Court determines that the legal effect of
the conveyance to Appellant in 1937 did not operate to create a
severance of that portion of Lot 17 occupied by Appellant and the
Court concludes that Appellant has not acquired title by adverse
possession, the Court should find that the Appellant has a right
to continued use of the disputed portion of Lot 17. The Appellant
has occupied that portion of Lot 17 occupied by his garage in
excess of 60 years.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLANT ACQUIRED HIS HOME AND REAL PROPERTY BY A
DIRECT CONVEYANCE FROM SUMMIT COUNTY.

Appellee's Brief confuses factual statements and the
language of the relevant documents with conclusions of law.
Appellee argues that because the tax deed to Emil Nyman in 1937
does not specifically describe property located in Lot 17, then
3

no interest was transferred to Nyman in Lot 17.
conclusion does not follow.

That legal

As previously discussed in Section

I, subsection B of his Brief, Appellant's predecessors received
their interest in the subject property in a direct conveyance
from Summit County.2
The fact is that Appellant's predecessor, Backman,
originally acquired land in Blocks 75 and 76 of the Park City
Survey

"according to possession" R.305 (emphasis added).

That

land of Backman's, whatever it was, was taken by Summit County
for non-payment of taxes.

That same land of Backman's, whatever

it was, was sold in 193 7 by Summit County to Nyman.

Facts do not

comprise a severance; severance is a legal statement or
conclusion to be drawn from the fact of the predecessors'
possession and Summit County's conveyance to those predecessors.
The legal conclusion, that the tax deed actually conveyed what
the County took from Bachman, regardless of completeness of legal
description and enumerated lot numbers, is one of the issues
presented in this appeal.

Appellee would have the Court believe

that the County's tax assessments relate solely to that property
described in the tax roll.

Yet that circumstance is inconsistent

with the actual assessments historically made by the County in

At the time of the conveyance to the Appellee, Summit
County could only convey what it owned. Summit County had
previously conveyed the disputed property to the Appellant's
predecessors.
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this case.

The tax notices relating to the taxes assessed

against Appellant reflect assessments against the home and
outbuildings independent from the separate assessments for real
estate.

See R. 306-376.

And, significantly, the relative values

attributed respectively to the land and to the structures
undeniably demonstrate that the County was not assessing only the
100-150 square feet of Lots 18 and 19 contained within the
overall area possessed and controlled by the Appellant and his
predecessors.

It defies logic and reason to assert or to believe

that the County historically has intended and effected a
mismatched tax assessment scheme where structures in one location
and real property in a disjointed location are intentionally
assessed and taxed together under one tax identification number
and account.
The extent and configuration of the land possessed by the
Appellant and his predecessors is not in dispute, despite
Appellee's assertions that the legal descriptions are vague and
that the record lacks support. Backman's ownership related to a
"... house ..., the steps leading down to said Empire Canyon ...
with all outbuildings and improvements ... and sufficient space
around the same for the convenient use and occupation thereof".
R. 304 (emphasis added).

Backman's property was also described

"as Lots 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of Block 75 and Lots 18 and 19
of

Block 76 ... according to possession". R. 305 (emphasis
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added).

Appellant prepared and provided a survey of the property

demonstrating those lines of possession. R. 303. No objection to
this boundary has been presented or preserved, and no counter
assertion regarding which land is at issue has been made or
presented, against Appellant's factual statements establishing
this boundary.

No objection can now be presented that the survey

does not correspond to the actual boundaries defining the
property purchased by Appellant and his predecessors from the
County or that the survey does not accurately set out what has
been owned and occupied by Appellant's predecessors. Issues not
preserved in the lower court cannot be raised on appeal. As a
general matter, appellate courts will not consider an issue
raised for the first time on appeal.

Those issues not raised are

waived and cannot be considered on appeal.

Condas

v.

Condas,

618

P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).
Appellee's argument that the exclusion of any reference to
"Lot 17" in the Appellant's legal descriptions precludes
Appellant from obtaining any interest in disputed parcel ignores
facts that the original deeds relate to property held "by
possession".

Appellee selectively accepts language from the

deeds and assessment records which state Lot 17, on the part of
Appellee, and Lots 18 and 19, on the part of Appellant, and
Appellee ignores the language of the original deeds relating to
property as being defined by possession.

6

A simple inspection of

the survey itself demonstrates why the parties used that language
nearly a century ago. Lot 17 in Block 76 lies parallel with, but
west of, Lot 27 in Block 75.

The Snyder special warranty deed

(R. 305) describes a broad collection of lots, supplemented with
and clarified by the language ''according to possession" .

The

likelihood that minor, minute, spillover possession into adjacent
lots could occur was contemplated and addressed by the parties in
this manner.

It is also worth noting in this regard that the

Grantor in this special warranty deed, W. I. Snyder, Trustee, is
the same landowner who owned Lot 17 and who was dispossessed for
tax nonpayment of taxes in Appellee's chain of title.

We are now

concerned with the legal effect of that particular choice of
language by those ancient parties and by the long term status quo
honoring that transfer of land, as demonstrated by the long term
status quo possession of the property. Appellant submits that the
legal effect was to sever that portion of Lot 17 possessed by
Appellant's predecessors from the balance of Lot 17.

Appellant

further submits that the legal effect of the tax foreclosure and
ultimate sale of this property by Summit County to Appellant's
predecessors was to transfer that severed portion of Lot 17,
ultimately, to Appellant.
II.

APPELLANT HAS OBTAINED TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.

In the event the Court determines that the legal effect of
the earlier conveyances and tax foreclosure was not to have
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effected a severance of the portion of Lot 17 in question, then
Appellant asserts that he and his predecessors have established a
right to title under the doctrine of adverse possession.
Appellant agrees with Appellee that in order to prevail
under the theory of adverse possession, Appellant must prove that
he has complied precisely with the requirements of the applicable
statutory provisions.

Appellant submits that he had done so.

Appellant has possessed the land in the statutorily prescribed
manner for more than the statutory period.
the land adversely to the title holder.

Appellant has held

Appellant has paid all

taxes legally assessed against the land for the statutory seven
year period.
Appellee asserts two positions in opposition to Appellant's
claim.

First, Appellee asserts that in order to prevail,

Appellee must show that he has paid all of the taxes assessed
against the entirety of Lot 17 for the requisite period.

Second,

Appellee asserts that no adverse possessory rights may accrue
against lands held by a political subdivision, in this case
against Summit County.

Both assertions are wrong.

Regarding the first assertion, that Appellant must pay all
taxes assessed against the entirety of Lot 17, Appellee ignores
the fact that we are concerned only with the property actually in
dispute, which is a minor portion of the overall acreage of Lot
17.

The statutory requirements for adverse possession are:

8

... the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of
seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-12-12 (1953, as amended)(emphasis added).

The plain reference to be inferred from the phrase "upon
such land" is to "the land [which] has been occupied and
claimed".

Appellant does not claim, and has not occupied, any

portion of Lot 17 other than the sliver of land at issue in the
underlying action.

The adverse possession laws do not require

claimants to have pay taxes on more property than that to which
they assert a claim.

The laws only require the payment of taxes

upon precisely that property which the claimants have "occupied
and claimed".

Id.

Regarding the second assertion that adverse possession
cannot take place against a political subdivision, Appellee cites
and relies upon the inapposite case of Averett
Drainage

District

No.

1,

§ 269.

Adverse

These authorities deal with the public

the property in question.

County

763 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1988) and the

general rule analysis contained in 3 AM. JUR. 2D
Possession

v. Utah

use of

Appellant has already addressed the

issue of public versus private use and it is worth noting that
Appellee also acquired his interest in Lot 17 as a result of the
prior disposition of the property from Summit County into private
hands.

Summit County obviously felt that Lot 17 and other

property in the surrounding area more appropriately belonged in

9

private rather than public use; Summit County was the selling
grantor to the predecessors of both Appellant and Appellee, as
well as other private parties.
Concerning the Appellee's citations to the state of the law
in Arizona and Appellee's general arguments regarding the
inapplicability of the doctrine of adverse possession against the
State and its political subdivisions, both fail to address or to
respond to the explicit exception contained in Utah's adverse
possession statute,

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-12-13 (1953, as amended).

This statute is intended to deal with the question of adverse
possession of public streets, ways and public use lands.

This

issue is distinct from the question of adverse possession against
non-public use lands owned by political subdivisions of the
State.

Regarding the adverse possession of public lands, it is

hard to imagine or to conceive, even speaking hypothetically, of
a factual situation which more closely fits the exception
contained in the statute than the case at bar.

The statute

states:
Adverse possession of public streets or ways. No person
shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any
lands held by any town, city or county, or the corporate
authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets,
lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any
other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof, for any
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively
appear that such town or city or county or the corporate
authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, and
conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for valuable
consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent
to such conveyance, the purchaser, his grantees or
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successors in interest, have been in the exclusive,
continuous and adverse possession of such real estate; in
which case an adverse title may be acquired.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-12-13 (1953 as amended) (emphasis added).

This statute begins by establishing a prohibition against
the adverse possession of lands held by the government for public
use.

The statute continues by creating an exception to that

general rule.

To trigger the exception to the statutory

prohibition, one requires:
1.

That the town or city or county or the corporate

authorities thereof;
2.

Sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed;

3.

Such real property;

4.

To a purchaser for valuable consideration; and

5.

That for more than seven years subsequent to such

conveyance, the purchaser ... ha[s] been in the exclusive,
continuous and adverse possession of such real estate, in which
case an adverse title may be acquired.
This precisely describes the situation existing in this
case.

Here, Summit County sold property in 1937 to Appellant's

predecessor for valuable consideration.

Appellant and his

predecessors have been in exclusive, continuous and adverse
possession of that property since that time.

For the period from

1937, the time when Summit County sold to Appellant's
predecessors, through 1960, the time of the first tax assessment
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against Lot 17 to Appellee's predecessors, Appellant and his
predecessors paid all the taxes assessed against the garage (as
well as the rest of Appellant's property) and, since no other
taxes were being assessed against Lot 17, Appellant and his
predecessors paid all of the taxes assessed according to law.
These taxes were paid by Appellant continuously and on time from
1937 through 1953, but were paid delinquently in 1954.
Nevertheless, the 14 year period from 1937 through 1953 stands at
double the statutory requirement of seven years necessary to
perfect the adverse title provided under the exception in the
statute.

Appellant has affirmatively shown that he has met the

various requirements of adverse possession through precise
compliance.

Appellant is entitled to an award of adverse title

to the 177 square feet of Lot 17 at issue in this case.
III. EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT APPELLANT DOES NOT
HAVE TITLE PURSUANT TO A DIRECT CONVEYANCE OR ADVERSE
POSSESSION, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE APPELLANT IS
ENTITLED TO A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT.
In the event the Court determines that the legal effect of
the earlier conveyances and tax foreclosure was not to have
effected a severance of the portion of Lot 17 in question and the
Court further determines that no adverse possession of the
property in question has been established by Appellant, then
Appellant asserts that he and his predecessors have established a
prescriptive use or easement against that portion of Lot 17 at
issue.

Thus, the Appellant has a right to continued use of the
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disputed area.
Appellee attempts to couch the doctrine of prescriptive use
or easement in terms of some alternative form of adverse
possession and then to denounce the doctrine as a circumvention
of the requirements of adverse possession.

This legal sleight of

hand is inaccurate and incorrect.
The doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive use or
easement are two very different concepts with two very different
goals.

The doctrine of adverse possession addresses ownership of

property and the concept of title. Its policy is to establish
title to property in persons who meet the doctrine's
legislatively created requirements. Its goal is to award
ownership to those persons whose actions and efforts, with
respect to a particular piece of property, exceed the legal
thresholds establishing an entitlement or superior right to the
title.

Its result is a transfer of title between the parties.

It establishes new legal rights and relationships.
The doctrine of prescriptive use or easement, on the other
hand, has nothing to do with ownership or title. The doctrine of
prescriptive use addresses the long term, unmolested use of
property by non-owners and the concept of status quo.

Its policy

is to recognize and to maintain the long time, indeed historic,
uses of property by persons who meet the doctrine's judicially
created requirements.

Its goal is to declare the establishment
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of a status quo regarding conflicting but unchallenged property
utilization by persons other than the owner of land over very
long periods of time. Its result is the maintenance of the
existing status quo between the parties.
new legal rights and relationships.

It does not establish

And it certainly does not

transfer title.
Appellee argues that the declaration of a prescriptive
easement in this case awards all of the attributes of ownership
to the prescriptive claimant.

Appellee is simply wrong.

Appellee still holds a significant portion of the "bundle of
rights" that ownership represents.

Appellee continues to own the

underlying property and could include the square footage of the
property in the overall square footage of his property generally
for purposes of planning and zoning entitlements.

Appellee

retains the right to prevent the Appellant from altering his
prescriptive use of the property.

Appellee's continuing

ownership gives Appellee standing in regards to legal proceedings
concerning the property in question.

And, perhaps most

significantly, Appellee receives a full restoration of his
"bundle of rights of ownership" to the property in question when
the prescriptive use ceases.

None of this is the case under an

award of title pursuant to adverse possession.

Simply put,

Appellee's statement that "it [prescriptive rights] is a fee
simple interest" is simply wrong.
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Appellee also is wrong on another count.

Appellee states

that "Appellant is attempting to gain title to the property,
underlying the garage, prescriptively without proving all of the
elements necessary to acquire title by adverse possession."
Appellee's Brief at 22.

This is not so. Appellant is requesting

that the Court declare exactly what the law provides.

Appellant

is not asking for the Court to grant more than the law provides.
If the Appellant has demonstrated his right to title to the
disputed parcel, then Appellant is entitled to that award and the
Court should give it to him.

If the Appellant has not

demonstrated this right, then he should not receive that award.
But the analysis and decision regarding maintaining the status
quo between these parties is completely independent of that
question of title.
As far as the claim by Appellant for a prescriptive easement
is concerned, it is this Court which established the requirements
for that right.

It is this Court which decided that twenty years

of open and continuous use of land under a claim of right gives
rise to a presumption of adverse use.
961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998).

Valcarce

v.

Fitzgerald,

It is this Court which declared that

this open, continuous and adverse use of another's land under
claim of right for twenty years establishes a prescriptive
easement.

Appellant submits that the record is clear regarding

his having met these requirements.
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Appellant submits that,

regardless of the Court's ultimate determination on the state of
the title of the disputed parcel, Appellant is entitled to an
order declaring the prescriptive use and maintaining the status
quo which has existed on this land for over fifty years.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing and the argument and contents set
forth in the Brief of Appellant, this Court should determine that
the trial court erroneously concluded that the Appellant has no
right to the property underlying his garage either through a
direct conveyance, adverse possession or prescriptive use.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J *

day of July, 2002.

¥fo^<&¥^

John R. tyefimer
Kimberly ^EX Washburn
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served, via first class
mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Robert W. Adkins, Esq.
P.O. Box 660
Coalville, Utah 84017
DATED this
/>
•is 9->

day of July, 2 002

17

